Seymour Hersh on 'the Madness of King George' · 3 November 2007, 08:27 CET by Charles Vermeulen
Last week Seymour Hersh visited Groningen, the Netherlands, to deliver a lecture at the Van der Leeuw-lezing (Van der Leeuw Lecture). Click here to read his complete lecture on, among other things, ‘the Madness of King George’ and its corrupting effect on U.S. societey.
george bush,
groningen,
iraq,
king george,
seymour hersh,
van der leeuw lezing
Geert Wilders's Call for a Ban on the Qur'an · 9 August 2007, 19:19 CET by Charles Vermeulen
Last Saturday Ehsan Jami, an Iran born (Mashad, 20 april 1985) Dutch PvdA politician and founder of the (Dutch) Central Comitee for Ex-Muslims, was molested by three men, probably because of his qualification of some statements of the prophet Muhammad as backward. Seemingly as a response on the assault on Jami populist frontman of the PVV (Party for Freedom) and MP Geert Wilders wrote an op-ed, which was published in yesterday’s edition of Dutch daily de Volkskrant. In this op-ed, entitled ‘Genoeg is genoeg: verbied de Koran’ (‘Enough is Enough: Ban the Qur’an’), Wilders compares the Qur’an with Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ and incites (I assume his fellow MP’s and / or the Government) to ban the Qur’an. By this Wilders harms the interests of the country he says he’s vindicating. He’s pouring oil on the flames and, as such, is forcing the Netherlands to use its resources for a fight that shouldn’t be fought. It could use its resources in a far better way.
Let there be no mistake about it: there’s no place in the Netherlands for people who think they have the right to use violence against people who don’t share their (religious) beliefs. People who think otherwise and act correspondingly or threaten to do so, should be dealt with by the law. Furthermore, (potential) victims, like Ehsan Jami or Geert Wilders, should be protected against them at any cost. However, by constantly proclaiming that the existence of a moderate Islam is an illusion Wilders strains reality and offends the large majority of Dutch muslims who live normal and peaceful lives. Demanding a ban on the Qur’an can only be intepreted as an attempt to change this reality and to force the moderates to choose between apostacy and extremism. As such Wilders’s way of thinking closely resembles the obtuse, primitive black-and-white way of thinking of the ones he says he’s fighting.
But also out of sheer realpolitik a less hysteric and more considered response would be welcome. The exact outcome of a ban on the Qur’an in the Netherlands will be unsure. No doubt, however, it will result in unprecedented, societal instability, no doubt Dutch (economic) interests abroad will be seriously violated and no doubt it will put Dutch lives at risk. There’s no way the Netherlands could profit from such a measure. On the contrary, it will only harm the country. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the United States decided to invade Iraq. This was a rash, badly considered decision as a result of which the country’s military capability and economy are dangerously strained, just at a time that ambitious countries as Russia, China and Iran are challenging its world-dominion. By this the Americans set a bad example. The lesson to be learned from it, however, seems to be wasted on Wilders. But as the Dutch live in the same, changing world as the Americans, they can’t afford to be dragged into a conflict that will drain all of their resources either. By renouncing Wilders’s statements, therefore, the Dutch government did the only right thing.
ban on the qur'an,
ehsan jami,
geert wilders,
jami,
netherlands,
pvda,
pvv,
qur'an,
the netherlands,
wilders
New Policy Towards Pakistan Required (2) · 15 July 2007, 21:42 CET by Charles Vermeulen
Shortly after the raid that ended the Red Mosque siege an anonymous source inside the Pakistani secret services leaked to Spanish news agency EFE that the Pakistani government attempts to cover up the scale of the bloodshed which the raid resulted in. (nu.nl, July 11, 2007) Apparently this source felt the need to depict the government of President Pervez Musharraf as an enemy of the extremists. Furthermore the impression arises that at least some within the Pakistani secret services feel sympathy for Pakistan’s extremists. According to military analyst Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, however, President Musharraf used the raid on the extremist bulwark to appear before the footlights as an indispensable ally in the War on Terror and, as a result of this, to gain foreign support. In reality the relationship between the Musharraf government and Pakistan’s extremists is, on the contrary, very intimate. (NRC Handelsblad, July 5, 2007) This view complies with the findings of Carnegie Endowment scholar Frédéric Grare (‘Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan. An action agenda for the United States and Europe’, July, 2007) which I will deal with later and with Barnett R. Rubin’s view, as he expounded this in ‘Saving Afghanistan’, an article in the January / February edition of Foreign Affairs (volume 86, number 1, page 57-79) (For Rubin’s view also read ‘A New Policy Towards Pakistan Required’. How should the U.S. and its allies deal with this apparent close relationship? Both Grare and Rubin offer several recommendations in their above mentioned articles. Here, however, I would like to line up some ideas from ‘A False Choice in Pakistan’, an article on the matter written by Daniel Markey in the July / August edition of Foreign Affairs (volume 86, number 4, page 85-102). Markey is ‘Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations’ and ‘served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff from 2003 to 2007.
Markey’s article opens with the current state of the partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan in the War on Terror. Because of the fact that almost six years after 9/11 the Taliban is alive and kicking, destabilizing Afghanistan from its safe haven in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, that al Qaeda’s top also resides safely in Pakistan and that terrorist attacks both inside and outside Pakistan ‘persist with deadly regularity’ many in the U.S. are developing serious doubts about the alliance with Islamabad. ‘They charge (...) that Musharraf and his allies in Islamabad have taken billions of dollars in U.S. aid while doing too little to advance – and, in many ways, much to undermine – the fight against terrorism’. Because of this they argue that the U.S. should take a tougher stance on the Musharraf government, even threaten with sanctions, to force it to deal more aggressively with terrorism. Furthermore, they argue that the U.S. should actively promote a process of democratization, to downplay the role of the military in the government and to get a government of Pakistan’s moderates that will be really committed to counter extremism by addressing ‘the social and developmental deficiencies that cause extremism’.
According Markey such change of attitude will be counter-productive. First of all, tougher talk towards the Pakistani government, by threatening to cut military assistance, end the sale of major defence systems as the promissed sale of 36 F-16 jets, will only fuel deep-seated feelings of distrust about the durability of Washington’s support for the country. That is, the feeling exists that after Afghanistan is pacified and Bin Laden captured the U.S. will lose interest in the country. The continuing support of the Pakistani army and Inter-Services Intelligence for militant groups like the Taliban is only a result of this distrust and based on the notion that it served their security issues before, for example in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and will do so in the future after the U.S. has abandoned them. Other negative consequences for the U.S. might be that the skeptics in the military will be emboldend further at the expense of friends of the U.S. and that, if training programs will be cut, a cadre of officers will be created with ‘no personal connections to their U.S. counterparts and, correspondingly, less trust in or sympathy for the United States’. To conclude, sanctions targeted at the military will especially hit Pakistani officers, whose role in counterterrorism operations is ‘most vital’.
Secondly, efforts to downplay the role of the Pakistani army in society and to develop a ‘civilian democratic rule’ won’t work too, Markey states. Not so much because elections will result in a victory for extremists – for according to Markey it’s more likely that free and fair elections result in the ‘return power to the mainstream civilian powers’ as Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League. But because it will be hard to circumvent the army, ‘Pakistan’s strongest government institution’ and the only force in Pakistan that will be able make a bold stand against the country’s extremists. Pakistan’s civilian institutions, on the other hand, are weak because they suffered from neglect or have become ‘incorperated into the army’s expanding sphere of influence’. This means that, even if national elections will result in a new government, in the end, it’s the army that calls the shots.
Now let’s take a closer look at Markey’s view on the relationship between the military and the secret services on the one hand and Islamists on the other, for it rather differs from the view of the supporters of a less cautious attitude towards Islamabad. As the latter believe that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to sever this relationship, Markey is more positive about it. He discerns several developments which will likely make the Pakistani army more ‘amenable to a strategic shift’. First of all, because it realizes that maintaining ties with the Islamists has become very dangerous. Until 9/11 the U.S. ‘tolerated, applauded, or overlooked Pakistan’s association with Jihadi groups’, but after 9/11, as the Bush administration took on its ‘with us or against us’ strategy, Islamabad would invoke the wrath of Washington if it would continue its overt support for the extremists. Secondly, Musharraf’s siding with the U.S. makes him ‘a marked man’, a target for ‘jihadi sponsored attempts on his life’. Furthermore, as a result of heavy clashes in the Federally Administered Tribal Area’s the relationship between the army and extremists has deteriorated.
To continue, Markey sees two more favorable developments. To start with, the relationship between Pakistan and India has improved since India extended its ‘hand of friendship’ by the mouth of its Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in April 2003. This ‘offers tangible economic and political incentives for putting an end to the militancy over Kashmir’. The other development Markey discerns is the ‘commitment to building Afghanistan’s nascent democratic institutions, supporting President Hamid Karzai’s Pashtun-led government and remaining in the country for the foreseeable future’ which the United States and NATO ‘convincingly demonstrate’. As consequence of this commitment the Pakistani army will be more inclined to ‘invest in Afhanistan’s stability rather than hedge against collapse or the rise of a threatening neighbour’. Considering, for example, the desperate call for more troops on the ground by retired Canadian major-general Lewis MacKenzie, whom I quoted in the previous posting, Markey’s valuation of the state and nation-building process in Afghanistan sounds somewhat optimistic, so to speak. Therefore, his prediction that Pakistan’s military is now more likely to invest in Afghanistan’s stability doesn’t sound convincing either. Nonetheless, Markey might have a point here: when NATO shows true commitment as far as Afghanistan is concerned, Pakistan might become more willing to support pacification of Afganistan.
Now, what should Washington do to make the relationship with Islamabad more profitable? Markey sees a ‘twofold task for U.S. policy makers’. On the one hand they should stimulate Pakistan’s commitment in fighting terrorism. They can accomplish this by following ‘three basic rules’, which will demonstrate that Washington intends to maintain a long-term partnership with Pakistan and that allying with extremists isn’t an option anymore. To start with, rebukes and threats, whether issued publicly or privately, should be avoided, for they only undermine Pakistan’s confidence in a partnership with the United States. Secondly, the U.S. should show ‘tangible benefits’ of this partnership, by continuing to provide Pakistan with money and materiel, by addressing Islamabad’s security issues in Kabul and New Delhi and by promoting the ‘Indo-Pakistani rapprochement’ in order to, among other things, ‘link Pakistan’s economy into India’s massive growth engine’. Thirdly, when Washington feels the need to be more compelling towards Pakistan it should do this by demanding Islamabad to allow the U.S. to be more engaged in Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. It’s important to note that Pakistan ‘is deeply averse to having U.S. armed forces operate autonomously’ within its borders, so it should try to integrate Americans into Pakistani forces in an unobtrusive way. This will show Washington’s willingness ‘to invest in long-standing, working-level ties and that its ultimate goal is deeper, closer cooperation’. More U.S. engagement could, furthermore, be expressed by assistance by improving ‘the effectiveness of Pakistan’s security and intelligence services’ and transforming its heavy army ‘into a more agile counterterrorism, counterinsurgency force’. Because a weak state and economy is a source of discontent and radicalization Washington should, to conclude, invest in Pakistan’s institutions and its infrastructure.
On the other hand, U.S. policy makers should not promote the democratizing of Pakistan as a means of getting rid of a government led by Musharraf and the military. Instead, they should acknowlegde the role of the army and prop a government consisting both of Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League as well as Bhutto’s PPP. The military shouldn’t be ignored for reasons expounded above. The PPP, a ‘nationwide mainstream party’, should be part of the government because it will make this government more rooted in Pakistan society and, consequently, better equipped to deal with extremism. Markey discerns three ‘basic principles’ which ‘top U.S. officials’ should use as a point of departure for their attempts to promote elections which will lead to a Musharraf-Bhutto government. First of all, they should prevent that the elections will be rigged by ‘hard-liners around Musharraf’ by, among other things, sending observers. Secondly, Washington should unequivocally advocate human rights and the rule of law to further the creation of an alliance of Pakistan’s ‘progressive political forces’, which will be better able to cope with the country’s extremists. Thirdly, to conclude, it should stress the importance of ‘internal party democracy’, because this will create parties that won’t depend on individuals or families anymore, parties that will outlast individuals and families.
9/11,
afghanistan,
al qaeda,
benazir bhutto,
bhutto,
bush,
bush administration,
musharraf,
pakistan,
red mosque,
taliban
'We have a tiny, tiny force in Afghanistan' · 7 July 2007, 10:57 CET by Charles Vermeulen
While the knuckels of Dutch Defence Minister Eimert van Middelkoop were rapped by a majority in parliament this week after he had stated that the Dutch goverment intended to keep an army in Afghanistan after August 2008, retired Canadian major-general Lewis MacKenzie calls upon the NATO members to double its military presence on the ground in the country.
afghanistan,
mackenzie,
nato,
netherlands,
van middelkoop
The Taliban as a Migration Age Tribe (1) · 2 June 2007, 10:17 CET by Charles Vermeulen
Let us start with the lack of a stable, societal and political context in both nowadays Afghanistan and Late Antiquity / Early Medieval Europe in which the Migration Age tribes came into being. In the May / June edition of Foreign Affairs (volume 86, number 3, pages 24-40) Bruce Riedel once more stresses that al Qaeda ‘thrives on failed and failing states’ (page 32) (Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Balochistan / Baluchistan-Pakistan). The same applies for the Taliban, which came into power in war-torn Afghanistan and which is apparently resurging from its sanctuary in Quetta in turbulent Baluchistan-Pakistan after being pushed out of Afghanistan. (Barbett R. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, volume 86, number 1, page 57-79) In this respect European Migration Age tribes were no different: a prerequisite for their creation seems to be that, in the words of Reinhard Wenskus, ‘der ganze Raum sich schon einem Unruhezustand befindet.’ (Stammesbildung und Verfassung, page 76) This brings us to another, closely related similarity: their capability to absorb various kinds of people and the considerable social mobility as a result of this capability which their presence in a certain area seem to bring about.
In ‘The Sham Fight with the Taliban’ (‘Het Schijngevecht met de Talibaan’), an article in M (April 2007, pages 50-57), newspaper NRC Handelsblad’s monthly, journalist Antoinette de Jong reports that the Taliban are mutated into a ‘sponge’ for the ‘growing group of opponents of the Karzai-government’, which makes them almost ineradicable anno 2007. As such they’re reinforced by drugs cartels and militants originating from bin Laden’s training camps. The fact that Hamid Karzai is a member of the Pashtun tribe the Durrani, furthermore, influences the ethnic composition of the Taliban, which apparently are attractive to the age old adversaries of the Durrani, the Ghilzai. In ‘Saving Afghanistan’, an article in the January / February edition of Foreign Affairs (volume 86, number 1, page 57-79) Barbett R. Rubin furthermore states that the Taliban ‘have drawn on fugitives from Afghanistan, newly minted recruits from undisrupted training camps and militant madrasahs, and tribesmen alienated by civilian casualties and government and coalition abuse to reconstitute their command structure, recruitment and funding networks, and logistical bases in Pakistan’. (page 58)
According to Wenskus the Migration Age tribes were no less dynamic. That ‘der ganze Raum sich schon einem Unruhezustand befindet’ and people were forced to leave behind their homes was important, because it meant that the existing ‘Klansystem’ came under pressure and splinter groups were enabled to break away from the clans. These splinter groups, Wenskus stated (ibidem), were better equipped to assimilate to other, larger groups than the clans. In such a situation the so-called Wanderlawinen (‘migration avalanches’), which formed the starting point of the typical Migration Age tribe (Stammesbildung, pages 439-441), could arise. These Wanderlawinen, however, were unstable constellations. While migrating their composition permanently changed as again and again new members joined the bands and others left. (Stammesbildung, pages 429-458 and passim) As a consequence of this Migration Age tribes were ethnic heterogeneous / polyethnic units by definition. Only after settlement in a certain area the Wanderlawine could morph into a more steady, lasting form. An example, drawn from Herwig Wolfram’s History of the Goths (Berkeley 1988) may illustrate this polyethnic nature of a Migration Age tribe:
In the same work Herwig Wolfram furthermore shows that Migration Age tribes were not only capable of absorbing people with various ethnic backgrounds; once in the Roman empire they offered the posibility of upward social mobility to ‘the native lower classes’ as well. In the case of the Gothic groups this meant that slaves, peasants, skilled craftsmen and merchants all tried to become a warrior in the Gothic army. For, as Wolfram states, ’[t]he principle of the time is clear: whoever proves himself as warrior is lord; whoever works (...) is and will remain a slave.’ (History of the Goths, pages 7-8 and passim)
As I wrote down above this posting is nothing more than some sketchy thoughts, some brainstorming written down, maybe ready to be thrown on the scrapheap for bad and useless ideas, so feel free to make short work of it.
afghanistan,
balochistan,
failed state,
gothic,
goths,
herwig wolfram,
migration age,
pakistan,
reinhard wenskus,
roman empire,
stammesbildung,
stammesbildung und verfassung,
taliban,
wenskus,
wolfram
Beware of Al Qaeda False Flag Operation · 29 May 2007, 06:30 CET by Charles Vermeulen
Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, in his essay ‘Al Qaeda Strikes Back’ in the May / June edition of Forreign Affairs (Volume 86, number 3, page 34 of pages 24-40).
al qaeda,
bruce riedel,
false flag,
false flag operation,
iran,
tehran
Saudi Students in the Land of Flowers (2) · 30 January 2007, 07:28 CET by Charles Vermeulen
In the previous posting I mentioned Saudi students who will be trained for physician during a seven years stay in the Netherlands. Part of their education will be an introduction into Dutch culture, which, apparently, also includes some attention for World War II, as the NOS Journaal report showed some students during a class who were asked if they could tell something about it. The answer of one of the students to this question was rather remarkable. Without batting an eyelid he replied: ‘it was actually between Japanese and also Americans. They killed many peoples (...) there in Hiroshima and Nagasaki’. Off course any account of World War II should be about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but why did the student start here? Did he also mention the bloodshed and destruction elsewhere in the world during the war? For example the atrocities committed by the Japanese in Nanking, China or the Holocaust? If he did so the report didn’t show it. However the fact remains that the student felt the need to start his answer with something which happened at the end of the war. But his mentioning of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might also have been his whole answer. Anyway, I would really like to see the history books which taught the boy about World War II.
hiroshima,
maastricht,
nagasaki,
netherlands,
saudi students,
university of maastricht
Saudi Students in the Land of Flowers · 29 January 2007, 21:32 CET by Charles Vermeulen
Today Dutch public television news show NOS Journaal reported about more than 560 students from Saudi Arabia who arrived in the Netherlands for a seven years stay during which they will be trained for physician. Later that night I sat on the couch to zap for a while and while doing so I ran into a show hosted by Dutch tv celebrities Patty Brard and Gerard Joling. Instantly my thoughts wandered to the Saudi students. What would they think of Patty Brard and Gerard Joling? Not very much right now, but they will be taught Dutch and then inevitably Dutch popular culture will penetrate their minds. This means that they will learn about Dutch minister for Integration and Immigration Rita Verdonk, about Geert Wilders who once said he eats headscarves for breakfast, about drunk, trashing hooligans flooding the streets after a soccer game. I could not help wondering what their final impression would be after seven years in the Netherlands? Will their stay bring the West and the Middle East together or will it fuel occidentalist sentiments? One student told the NOS Journaal reporter that she preferred a stay in the Netherlands to Australia, because, among other things, it was ‘lovely and quiet’. She wanted to stay in ‘the land of flowers’. I honestly hope she won’t be disappointed.
geert wilders,
gerard joling,
headscarve,
maastricht,
netherlands,
patty brard,
rita verdonk,
saudi arabia,
saudi students,
university of maastricht,
verdonk,
wilders
Al-Qaeda and George Orwell's Brotherhood · 28 January 2007, 09:41 CET by Charles Vermeulen
Currently I’m re-reading George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (the first time since secondary school) and what struck me yesterday was the resemblance between the way the Brotherhood is described as an organization by the character O’Brien half-way the book and the way Al-Qaeda is often characterized:
In short: both groups consist of various cells which operate independently and have no knowledge of each other’s existence and both are merely inspired and bound together by the same idea(s).
al-qaeda,
brotherhood,
george orwell,
nineteen eighty-four,
orwell
New Policy Towards Pakistan Required · 15 January 2007, 07:50 CET by Charles Vermeulen
In ‘Saving Afghanistan’, an article in the January / February edition of Foreign Affairs (volume 86, number 1, page 57-79) Barbett R. Rubin states that, ’[w]ith the Taliban resurgent, reconstruction faltering, and opium poppy cultivation at an all-time high’, Aghanistan is on the brink of relapsing into chaos. To prevent this the U.S. and its allies must rethink their strategy, especially as far as Pakistan is concerned. The latter granting a save haven along its tribal frontier from which the Taliban continue to destabilize Afghanistan.
After being expelled by the U.S. and its allies in 2001 the Taliban found an sanctuary in Pakistan, where they were able to regain strength and to threaten Afghanistan once again. In the first place this was the result of the policy of the Bush Administration to allow Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf ‘to focus on al Qaeda’s top leadership’ and to ignore the Taliban, Rubin states. In exchange for this the U.S. was allowed to set up bases and to hunt the al Qaeda leadership. Pakistan, furthermore, was forced to shut down A.Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation network. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligences (ISI) grasped this opportunity to continue to actively support the Taliban leadership, which currently uses the capital of Pakistani province Baluchistan, Quetta, as its main operational base. It’s crucial for the coalition forces to understand this relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban, for according to Rubin it’s the key to a better strategy for dealing with the Taliban threat.
Quintessence in Islamabad’s thinking on national security is coping with India, which is far more populous and possesses far more resources than Pakistan and which, according to the Pakistani, has never fully accepted Pakistan’s existence. This partly explains why Pakistan supports Islamist militia’s like the Taliban: to counter India’s influence in Kashmir and Afghanistan, in which the Northern Alliance allegedly has been an ally of India. By supporting Islamism among the Pashtun, furthermore, Pakistan tries to cope with Pashtun and Baluchi nationalism. The aim of supporting the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan, to conclude, is preventing the re-emergence of a regime in Kabul that denies the Durand Line as the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The importance of Pakistan’s aid to the Taliban should not be underestimated, for, according to ‘Western and Afghan officials’ Pakistan could disrupt the Taliban’s top leadership, but it has chosen not to do so. Disrupting the Taliban’s top leadership, however, should be considered the key to victory, Rubin states. To persuade Pakistan to accomplish this, requires several steps.
To start with, it’s necessary to put Islamabad under high pressure. The Pakistani government wants to be viewed as a full-fledged member of the international community. The allies must make use of this by making clear to Pakistan that if it doesn’t vigorously fight the Taliban top in Baluchistan this will endanger ‘international peace and security as defined in the UN Charter’. Washington, furthermore, must suspend military assistence and international aid if it fails to dismantle the Taliban leadership.
Besides that Pakistan’s main strategic concerns, that is the influence of India in Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s support for Pashtun and Baluchi nationalists which are ‘operating accross the Durand Line’, should be addressed too. Secondly, the U.S. and its allies should urge Kabul to start a debate about the recognition of the Durand Line as the official border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in exchange for ‘guarantees of stability and access to secure trade and transport corridors to Pakistani ports’. This would involve cooperation instead of conflict, but to accomplish this ‘reform and development in the tribal territories’ are a prerequisite, Rubin states. Furthermore, Washington should spur India and Afghanistan to persuade Pakistan that their bilateral relations don’t constitute a thread to the latter. To continue, if the Taliban indeed are considering, as some sources claim, ‘to drop their maximalist demands and give guarantees against the reestablishment of al Qaeda bases’, they should be allowed to join the political process. To conclude, the U.S. should stop simply supporting Musharraf, but instead prop democracy in Pakistan. As support for extremism in Pakistan have proved to be ‘marginal’ and Pakistan’s business class, ‘which is profiting from the reconstruction of Afghanistan’, is starting to flourish, the U.S. should grasp this opportunity to establish a more solid relationship with the country that is not only based on ties with the country’s military.
aghanistan,
al-qaeda,
baluchistan,
bush,
bush administration,
inter-services intelligences,
isi,
islamabad,
kabul,
musharraf,
pakistan,
quetta,
taliban,
washington